Yemen's Tribes Didn't Ask for Houthis' War
Houthis are attempting to manufacture an image of tribal consensus in Yemen and project an image of power and legitimacy.
On November 19, while UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg was in Muscat negotiating a settlement with Houthi representatives, their media apparatus launched a parallel operation that broadcast contradictory intentions. Houthi media chief Nasruddin Amer distributed a “tweet bank” containing 150+ pre-scripted messages for coordinated mass posting. The sheer mechanical precision of the campaign reveals how armed movements engineer consensus in real-time, and what it signals is more concerning than the propaganda itself.
The campaign, using #القبيلة_تتحدى_الصهاينة (”The Tribe Challenges the Zionists”), launched at exactly 9 PM Sana’a time and systematically covers every Yemeni governorate with identical messaging: tribal “readiness for coming confrontation,” divine mandate (”God called Yemenis ‘Ansar’ among all Arabs”), and absurd historical revisionism (”CIA tried to penetrate the Yemeni tribe,” “September 21 revolution ended all blood feuds”). This isn’t organic tribal sentiment at all; it’s centrally coordinated narrative saturation designed to project force while delegitimizing opposition. By framing any confrontation as “defense against Zionists and American tools,” the campaign pre-emptively casts Yemen’s government and army as foreign agents rather than legitimate domestic forces, creating a permission structure to attack fellow Yemenis as traitors serving external enemies. The propaganda erases Yemen’s complex tribal landscape, treating it as a monolithic entity that only Houthis “saved” from American “penetration.”

The formulaic nature of the scripted tweets exposes the coercion underneath. Consider these samples: “Armed tribal gathering in Hajjah governorate declares complete readiness for the coming escalation round,” “Tribes of Al-Bayda announce general mobilization in loyalty to the martyrs,” “Sanaa tribes renew their mandate to the Sayyed Leader for any coming confrontation.” The mechanical repetition, identical sentence structures, interchangeable geographic references, uniform calls for “readiness” and “loyalty to martyrs”, reveals propaganda manufactured for mass production, not genuine tribal expression. Real tribal politics in Yemen involves complex negotiations between lineage groups, economic interests, and local power dynamics. This campaign bulldozes that complexity into a single, fictional narrative of unified Houthi-aligned militancy.
The fiction of unified tribal support papers over a brutal history. When tribes have resisted Houthi authority, the response has been savage. In early 2019, the Hajour tribes in Hajjah sustained a three-month uprising that was violently crushed when expected government reinforcements never arrived, over 100 civilians died, thousands were besieged without access to food or medical care. A year later, the al-Awadh tribal uprising in al-Bayda was quelled in less than 24 hours, after the Houthis dragged out mediation for six weeks while quietly reinforcing their military positions. The campaign’s manufactured “readiness” erases this history of coercion, defections, economic grievances over Houthi taxation, and resentment of Zaidi revivalist ideology being imposed on Sunni tribal areas. The Houthis’ campaign isn’t reflecting reality; it’s manufacturing it through repetition while pre-emptively delegitimizing any tribal leader who might break ranks as a “traitor” and “American tool.”
What’s particularly revealing is that these aren’t unique formulations created for the tribal campaign; they’re the standard propaganda template the Houthis apply to everything. The same day as the tribal tweet bank launched, Houthi-controlled media ran stories about government office employees holding “vigils to affirm continuation of mobilization,” “Al-Aqsa Flood” military course graduates declaring “complete readiness to fight the American and Zionist enemy,” and water corporation workers emphasizing “readiness to confront enemies.” The phrases “جهوزيتها الكاملة” (complete readiness), “استمرارًا في التعبئة العامة” (continuation of general mobilization), and “وفاءً للشهداء” (loyalty to the martyrs) appear across dozens of unrelated stories, from education sector vigils to traffic police meetings to pharmaceutical training courses. The tribal campaign isn’t a special grassroots expression; it’s the same mass-production formula applied to create the appearance of tribal consensus.
The timing matters. At a moment when Yemen faces severe economic strain and internal pressures are mounting, the Houthis are investing heavily in external threat narratives. This is classic militia-state behavior: when domestic legitimacy erodes, manufacture an external enemy and frame any internal opposition as collaboration with that enemy. Simultaneously with the tribal campaign, Houthi media celebrated the detention of alleged “American-Israeli-Saudi spy networks” in what they framed as a major “security achievement.” The message is explicit: dissent equals espionage, opposition equals treason, and any challenge to Houthi authority serves foreign enemies. The propaganda infrastructure being built isn’t just projecting strength; it’s pre-emptively criminalizing any tribal leader who might break ranks.
Days after Grundberg’s shuttle diplomacy, al-Masirah declared the Oman roadmap dead, citing Mohammed bin Salman’s Washington visit as proof that Riyadh capitulated to external pressure. The outlet called for strikes on Gulf infrastructure and warned that Bab al-Mandab navigation could be “completely paralyzed.” The tribal mobilization campaign wasn’t hedging between war and peace, it was preparing for escalation while diplomatic theater played out in Muscat.
What this reveals is more significant than what it claims. The very need to manufacture tribal consensus at this scale exposes Houthi anxiety about actual tribal support. If tribal backing were organic and automatic, there would be no need for 150+ scripted tweets systematically covering every governorate. The campaign’s intensity reveals the gap between the regime’s claims of popular legitimacy and the reality of support that must be continuously produced, performed, and policed. Yemen’s tribes have their own interests, histories, and agency, the Houthis know this, which is why they work so hard to erase it in propaganda.
What the Houthis are attempting to erase and collapse into a single story and a single image deserves attention. Yemen’s tribal structure isn’t monolithic; it’s a fragmented landscape of confederations like Hashid and Bakil, each containing dozens of tribes with distinct interests, historical rivalries, and varying degrees of Houthi cooperation or resistance. Some tribes in Marib and al-Jawf have actively fought the Houthis; others in Hajjah and Amran have provided conditional support tied to local power-sharing arrangements.
Coordinated campaigns of this scale signal operational preparation, not mere messaging. They’re building narrative infrastructure for escalation. When violence comes, whether initiated by the Houthis or in response to external strikes, the information space has already been prepared. Dissent is already framed as collaboration. Opposition is already cast as treason. The “tribal consensus” is already established in the propaganda record, even if it doesn’t exist in reality. This is how armed movements create permission structures for repression while claiming popular mandate.
The implications extend beyond Yemen’s borders. This campaign serves multiple audiences: it signals to Iran that the Houthis maintain mobilization capacity; it warns Saudi Arabia and the UAE that any renewed intervention will face “tribal resistance”; and it positions the Houthis as the authentic representatives of Yemeni sovereignty against Western interference. For regional analysts and policymakers, the key indicator to watch is whether this propaganda saturation precedes kinetic action, either Houthi escalation in the Red Sea or strikes against targets in Saudi Arabia framed as “retaliation” for imagined provocations. The narrative infrastructure is being laid now; the question is whether the Houthis have the capacity or intention to follow through, or whether this is performance designed to extract concessions in ceasefire negotiations.
The strategy is clear: manufacturing an external threat at a time of regional ceasefire serves the Houthis internally. It helps them frame internal dissent as treason and project unity through propaganda saturation. It’s also a strong indicator that they are under pressure.
Yemen’s tribes didn’t ask for this war. The propaganda reflects a militia-state creating permission structures for violence it has already decided upon. The Houthis aren’t responding to tribal demands; they’re preemptively justifying escalation while framing any dissent as treason. When the next round of conflict comes, whether in the Red Sea, against Gulf infrastructure, or targeting internal opponents, the propaganda record will show “unified tribal support.” The reality of coerced compliance, brutal suppression of resistance, and systematic erasure of tribal complexity will be buried under the narrative. Washington and Riyadh need to read Houthi internal messaging, not their diplomatic performance, to assess their actual intentions.


